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AbstrAct
There is a growing gap between infrastructure needs and available funding along the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der. A recent proposal to address the situation calls for the creation of a bi-national mechanism of bond 
financing to enable sub-national governments from both countries to issue bonds jointly. Creating the 
legal infrastructure to attain this goal requires an evaluation of key aspects of existing regulations. It also 
calls for a discussion of the feasibility of regulatory harmonization. This article compares bond issuance 
rules and investor protection mechanisms in both countries and discusses how these differences may 
affect the viability of a bi-national bond mechanism.
Key words: U.S.-Mexico, border infrastructure, sub-sovereign bond markets, regulatory harmonization
resumen
Existe una brecha creciente entre las necesidades de infraestructura y los fondos disponibles a lo largo 
de la frontera entre Estados Unidos y México. Una propuesta reciente para enfrentar la situación llama a la 
creación de un mecanismo binacional de financiamiento mediante la emisión de bonos que permita a los 
go biernos subnacionales de ambos países emitirlos conjuntamente. Crear la base legal para lograr esta 
meta requiere la evaluación de aspectos clave en las regulaciones existentes y también supone una discu-
sión abierta acerca de la viabilidad de la complementación regulatoria. Este artículo compara las normas 
para la expedición de bonos y los mecanismos de protección a los inversionistas en ambos países, y dis-
cute cómo estas diferencias pueden afectar la viabilidad de un mecanismo de emisión de bonos binacional.
Palabras clave: México-Estados Unidos, infraestructura fronteriza, mercados infrasoberanos de bo-
nos, armonización regulatoria
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IntroductIon
Trade between Mexico and the United States has increased exponentially as a result 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta), but it has created a great need 
for border infrastructure. This need has not been paired with sufficient financial re-
sources. Estimates show that, as of 2005, there was a funding shortfall in the area of 
transportation infrastructure of US$860 million in Mexico and of US$10.5 billion in 
the United States (Shane, 2005). Traditionally, border infrastructure in the United 
States has been funded with multi-year appropriations administered by federal agen-
cies, state agencies, or metropolitan planning organizations. In Mexico, most funds 
for border infrastructure development come from the federal government, since it is 
responsible for federal and inter-state highways, international border crossings, bridg-
es, and roadway projects (SourcePoint, 2004). These funding sources have been de-
creasing due to intense competition for federal funds and shifting priorities in the 
both countries’ policy agendas. The issue has forced policymakers to think about in-
novative funding methods to attract alternative capital sources to the border region. 
In Mexico, the tendency has been to rely on concessions and service delivery 
agree ments with the private sector (Sct, 2006). The U.S. has relied upon various forms 
of credit assistance (for example, section 129 loans, state infrastructure banks, and 
tifia funds),1 tolling options (for example, general toll provisions, interstate reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation programs, and value pricing pilot programs), or innovative 
management of federal funds (advance construction, partial conversion of advance 
construction, toll credits, or tapered and flexible match strategies, etc.) (Federal High-
way Administration, 2002). Despite their usefulness, these mechanisms have been 
insufficient in closing the gap between infrastructure needs and available funds.
Even further, since the implementation of nafta, studies suggest that although 
trade has almost tripled, obstacles exist that increase transaction costs and undermine 
the benefits gained from the removal of tariffs (Villa, 2007). Some of these obstacles 
are related to insufficient investment in strategic border infrastructure (Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009). Fi-
nancing for some of these projects can be obtained from philanthropic organizations, 
taxation, user fees, partnerships with the private sector, or bond markets (Erickson 
and Eaton, 2002). Our focus, however, is on an emerging body of literature that ad-
dresses the issue of infrastructure finance from a cross-border perspective. 
The starting point for the study is a recent proposal to create a bi-national mech-
anism of debt finance for environmental infrastructure along the U.S.-Mexico border 
1 Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act.
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(Espinosa, 2012). The aim would be to facilitate private investor participation in bor-
der infrastructure development through the purchase of bonds issued jointly by U.S 
and Mexican state or local governments. Countries grouped in the aSEan+3 com-
munity have undertaken similar efforts in their attempts to create a regional market 
for Asian bonds (Asian Development Bank, 2008).2 In this case, the objective has been 
to diversify debt markets and use them as a supplement to bank finance (Eichen-
green, 2006). A core element of this initiative is the creation of standardized debt in-
struments and regional-level institutions to facilitate cross-border investments and 
reduce transaction costs. The expectation is that these measures would benefit Asian 
economies by funneling the substantial savings that these economies generate to 
regional projects (Dalla, 2003; Pei, 2005). Developing robust regional bond markets 
entails numerous challenges. Two major challenges have to do with crafting an insti-
tutional infrastructure facilitate cross-border investment, as well as enacting measures 
to assure that bond investors receive comparable levels of legal protection across 
jurisdictions. Overcoming these challenges can be difficult due to the divergence of 
jurisdictional legal systems or countries being at different stages of market develop-
ment. This is precisely the case of Mexico and the United States. 
Mexico and the United States have sizeable economic differences, but also con-
trasting legal systems. While Mexico’s legal framework is based on the civil law tra-
dition, the U.S. legal framework follows the principles of English common law. For 
scholars like La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), this is relevant because 
of the close link between the origins of a legal system and economic development. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) explain the divide between common 
and civil law in the context of securities regulations and capital market development and 
conclude that investor protection is stronger in nations with a common law system 
than in nations with a civil law system. What does this statement entail for countries 
seeking to develop financing alternatives for infrastructure development but whose 
regulations are anchored in different legal systems? Addressing this question is of 
great importance if the aim is to craft a cross-border bond financing mechanism. As 
Dalla (2003) illustrates when referring to Asian bond market regulations, fostering 
the development of regional bond markets would require effective harmonization in 
areas such as rating requirements, trading platforms and conventions, clearing and 
settlement procedures, accounting standards, tax treatment, and foreign exchange 
regulations, among others. 
2  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (aSEan) includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. China, Korea, and Japan, the “+3” nations, are 
not members but participate actively in the regional bond market project.
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This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on regulatory harmonization 
by comparing two aspects that we consider central for its success: the legal provi-
sions that regulate the issuance of public bonds –our emphasis will be on bonds is-
sued by sub-national governments, which we refer to in this article as Sng bonds–3 
and the current legal mechanisms to protect bond investors. The article is organized as 
follows: Section 2 sets the context for the discussion by providing the reader with 
an over view of recent reforms in securities regulations in Mexico and the United States. 
Section 3 explains the methodology for our study. Section 4 compares the regulations 
applicable to the issuance of sub-national debt and investor protection in Mexico 
and the United States. Section 5 discusses the policy reforms that would need to be 
considered to improve the feasibility of a bi-national bond financing mechanism. Sec-
tion 6 concludes and introduces the topics for further research.
bAckground
The analysis begins with an overview of some of the most significant reforms to fur-
ther the development of sub-national bond markets in Mexico and the U.S in recent 
years. 
Hildreth and Zorn (2005) provide us with a useful overview of the reforms in 
the United States between 1980 and 2005. Sub-national governments in this country 
have used a well-developed bond market to secure funding for many regional and 
local infrastructure projects. But, as the authors point out, reforms are still needed to 
protect the timeliness, cost-efficiency, and effectiveness of the U.S. municipal bond 
market. Hildreth and Zorn (2005) consider that a central element that contributed to 
the development of the U.S. municipal bond market was the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
and other relevant policies aimed at promoting market innovation and transparency 
(stricter rules for bond issuers, the creation of state bond banks, regulations facilitat-
ing the creation of credit enhancement mechanisms to protect investors, and the in-
troduction of the tax-exempt status for municipal bond instruments, among others). 
3  Two clarifications are pertinent at this point. The first refers to the meaning of the term “municipal bond.” 
In the literature on U.S. bond markets it is commonly used to refer to instruments issued by state and local 
governments (for example, cities, counties, or special districts). This article refers to these instruments as 
sub-national bonds or Sng bonds to avoid confusion with the term municipio, which describes a particular 
level of government in Mexico. The second clarification refers to the levels of government participating in 
the regulation of Sng bond markets. In the case of Mexico, the vast majority of bond market regulations 
pertain to the federal government (state Congresses have some participation, particularly in the establish-
ment of legal limits to indebtedness). The participation of U.S. states in the regulation of Sng bond markets 
is far more extensive, particularly on issues involving the issuance of Sng bonds in their jurisdictions.
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More recently, the United States has witnessed a new wave of regulatory efforts. 
To a large extent, they have been a response to the perceived laxity in the enforcement 
of previously enacted rules. They have also addressed the need for effective regula-
tions in a field that has become quite sophisticated. A central piece of legislation in 
this regard is the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
This is a comprehensive piece of legislation that introduced a gamut of new regula-
tions affecting almost every participant in securities markets and expanded the su-
pervisory powers of key U.S. federal government agencies. Doty (2010) considers that 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s implications are far-reaching and will have an effect on muni-
cipal securities markets. He considers that one of its most salient aspects is the power 
that Congress confers on the Securities Exchange Commission (SEc) and the Munici-
pal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSrb). These supervisory agencies have received an 
expanded mandate with the intention of reducing the probability of fraud and mis-
management in securities markets and to prevent investors being misled. 
Regulatory efforts are also noteworthy in the area of information disclosure, 
particularly in terms of municipal securities disclosure.4 In this case, recently enact-
ed reforms have resulted in additional regulations for bond issuers, such as the pro-
hibition for underwriters to purchase municipal securities if issuers do not make a 
contractual promise to disclose information continuously, or the expansion of the list 
of events subject to disclosure (Pope, 2001; Robbins and Simonsen, 2010). 
Interestingly, a common denominator in these reform efforts is a noticeable ten-
dency toward centralization of enforcement responsibilities (particularly in the case of 
the SEc), and increased strictness of newly enacted regulations. This tendency could be 
advantageous in terms of the cross-border mechanism of bond financing (U.S. states 
have traditionally played a preponderant role in regulating the securities that are issued 
in their jurisdictions, which could complicate regulatory harmonization efforts). 
In the case of Mexico, regulatory efforts in the last 15 years have geared toward 
the creation of a robust Sng bond market. Hernández-Trillo and Smith-Ramírez 
(2009) explain that before 1997, federal bailouts favoring financially distressed states 
and municipalities were a common practice. To correct the situation, the federal gov-
ernment introduced a market-based mechanism requiring sub-national govern-
ments issuing securities to negotiate the terms of their indebtedness directly with 
4  Municipal bonds are indirectly regulated through Rule 15c2-12. Enacted under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, this rule requires underwriters to receive, review, and disseminate official statements prepared by 
issuers of most primary offerings of municipal securities and to obtain continuing disclosure agreements 
from issuers and other obligated persons to provide material event disclosures and annual financial infor-
mation on a continuing basis; it also stipulates that broker-dealers must have access to information in order 
to recommend municipal securities on the secondary market (MSrb, n.d.). 
48
Salvador ESpinoSa and JoEl MoJica
nortEaMérica
creditors, make their own trust arrangements, use block transfers as collateral of debt, 
and assume all the risks involved in the issuance of debt instruments. These authors 
consider, however, that there are several elements that still need to be considered to 
ensure the success of the enacted reforms (a credible commitment from the federal 
government in the sense that bailouts will no longer happen, that the federal govern-
ment will effectively enforce capital market rules, that the fiscal information to be 
released by sub-national governments will be reliable, and that accounting standards 
across states will be homogeneous, among others). 
Castellanos and Martínez (2008) discuss the 2001 reforms to Mexico’s Securities 
Market Law (lMv), which sought to lower the cost of entry into the domestic bond mar-
ket and enable states to collateralize debt-service obligations by selling stock certifi-
cates through master trusts. Uribe-Lara (2008) considers that these reforms have 
contributed to reducing investment risk in the Sng bond market. But, as he correctly 
points out, important reforms in state legislations prevent markets for these types of 
bonds from developing further (for example, reforms to state budget laws to ensure 
continuity in the repayment of debt obligations if the annual budget is not approved 
on time). 
Evidently, the circumstances in which these reforms have been approved in 
Mexico and the United States differ. But even if recent regulatory efforts may give 
the impression that the enacted reforms in both nations seek to attain different objec-
tives or address different problems, one may argue that they are geared toward im-
proving regulating bodies’ capacity to monitor and sanction market players, and to 
ensuring that investors understand the inherent financial risks. But would the existing 
U.S. and Mexican legal infrastructure allow policymakers to craft a bi-national bond 
financing mechanism?  To assess the feasibility of such a proposal one must analyze 
the features of the existing securities regulations and evaluate whether the harmoni-
zation of bond market rules between the two countries can occur. This is the objec-
tive that we pursue in this article.
Following Zweigert and Kötz’s advice (1998) that any question guiding a com-
parative study must be posed in purely functional terms, we begin this analysis by 
posing the following question: How do existing securities laws regulate sub-nation-
al bonds and protect investors? 
methodology
We used a two-step approach to answer the research question posed above. First, we iden-
tified the legislation where the legal provisions of interest were contained (see Table 1).
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Table 1
RELEVANT U.S. AND MEXICAN REGULATIONS AFFECTING SECURITIES MARKETS
Level of Government Mexico United States
Federal Legislation •	 Mexican Constitution
•	 Stock Market Law (Ley del 
Mercado de Valores)
•	 Fiscal Coordination Law (Ley de 
Coordinación Fiscal)
•	 National Banking and Securities 
Commission, circular 11-29 
•	 U.S. Constitution
•	 Securities Act (1933)
•	 Securities Exchange Act 
(1934) 
•	 Trust Indenture Act (1939)
•	 Tax Reform Act (1986)
•	  Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Act 
•	 sec Rule 15c2-12 (1989)
State Legislation •	 Debt Laws (Leyes de deuda)
•	 Revenue Law (Ley de ingresos)
•	 Expenditures Law (Presupuesto 
de egresos)
•	 Financial Code (Código finan-
ciero)
•	 The issuance of debt 
instruments is regulated by 
each state (e.g., California 
Corporate Securities Law Act 
[1968], Arizona Securities 
Act, New Mexico Uniform 
Securities Act [1978], Texas 
Securities Act [1935])
Source: Authors’ compilation.
The second step consisted of a thorough review of these sources, which enabled 
us to understand the procedural rules that issuers of sub-national bonds must fol-
low, and the existing legal mechanism for investor protection. Given the complexity 
and extension of some of the legal provisions consulted, we considered the princi-
ples for securities regulations established by the International Organization of Secu-
rities Commissions (2003)5 and the work by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998; 2000) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) for identifying 
relevant variables for the analysis. The latter research was particularly useful when 
organizing the legal factors to be compared about Mexico and the United States; 
however, since this line of research focuses on corporate governance and our interest 
was on Sng bonds, some of the elements they identified were not applicable to govern-
5  This organization introduces 30 principles considered desirable features of a country’s securities regula-
tion, which are based upon three broad objectives: protecting investors, ensuring that markets are fair, 
efficient, and transparent, as well as reducing systematic risk. We paid particular attention to the following 
principles when deciding on the features of legal systems that would be assessed in our study: rules aimed 
at providing investors with full, accurate, and timely information material to their investment decisions; 
rules protecting them from misleading, manipulative, and fraudulent practices; and rules and procedural 
mechanisms to address grievances or resolve conflicts.
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ment issuers. The original list was hence refined to include only legal properties 
thought relevant for the analysis of government bonds. To make sure that no rele-
vant information was being left out, we validated the information by interviewing 
experts on securities regulation and Sng bond markets in Mexico and the United 
States. The features of the Mexican and U.S. securities regulations compared in this 
analysis are summarized in Table 2 (see Appendix).
bond mArket rules And Investor ProtectIon mechAnIsms 
In the u.s. And mexIco
This section article describes parts of the U.S. and Mexican legal frameworks dealing 
with procedural rules and creditor rights. This review is followed by a discussion of 
differences that we identified in these legal frameworks, and the implications they may 
have for a project aimed at creating bi-national bond instruments.
We begin with a brief review of Mexico’s Sng bond market legislation. The starting 
point is the Mexican Constitution, which states that sub-national governments can 
only raise funds in local debt markets and cannot acquire debt in any foreign currency. 
In addition, foreign entities, governments, or corporations cannot be creditors (Mexi-
can Constitution, Art. 117). Sub-national governments interested in issuing debt in-
struments can only raise capital from Mexican investors or companies registered 
in Mexican territory.
The legal framework includes general guidelines for securities issuers, as well 
as detailed procedural rules for private and public entity borrowers. The most im-
portant guidelines for an offering of securities in Mexico are described in the Securi-
ties Market Law (lMv). This legislation includes provisions that define the roles and 
responsibilities for all participants in the securities market6 and the types of securities 
and their characteristics,7 highlights conditions that purchasers or securities must 
meet,8 and lists the steps to register and offer securities on Mexico’s stock exchange.9
6  Rules and regulations pertaining to companies participating in the stock exchange are contained in Articles 
10 to 60; those referring to intermediaries, in Articles 113 to 224; investment advisors, Articles 225 to 227; 
organizations in charge of the development and implementation of operation standards and codes of con-
duct for the industry, Articles 228 to 231; other entities participating in the securities market, in Articles 322 
to 341; external auditing services, Articles 342 to 348; and regulations applicable to financial authorities, 
Articles 349 to 361.
7 Articles 61-69 list the different types of securities.
8  Articles 109-112 discuss the cases where investors must disclose information about a purchase to the regu-
latory entities and to the public.
9  Issuers must register the securities at Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Commission (cnbv) before 
offering it to the public. The steps that must be followed are contained in Articles 70 to 103. 
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An interesting stipulation in the law refers to fiduciary stock exchange certifi-
cates (certificados bursátiles fiduciarios) (lMv, Articles 61-69). Mexican local governments 
have used these types of financial instruments widely to finance multiple activities. 
These certificates require potential issuers of bond instruments to set up a master trust 
(fideicomiso irrevocable) to deposit the funds that issuers will pledge for the repay-
ment of the bond. There is no legal mandate requiring sub-national governments to 
issue only this type of debt instruments. However, using a trust has been perceived as 
an effective guarantee for investors and as a measure to try to separate the credit qual-
ity of the bond and the risk associated with the credit quality of the issuing state or 
municipality.
A salient matter that emerges when creating debt securities involves the reve-
nues that states can pledge to secure bond repayment. The tax capacity of state and 
municipal governments in Mexico is extremely limited and own-source revenues 
are, on average, less than 10 percent of total revenues (author’s calculations with data 
from Shcp [2005]). Consequently, the tendency has been to commit revenue flows 
that they expect to receive from the federal government. These financial sources in-
clude revenue-sharing transfers and some earmarked funds whose amounts need to 
be determined during annual budget negotiations. Since this is usually considered a 
stable source of revenue, investors have shown preference for securities using such 
transfers as guarantees. (In some cases, earmarked funds can be used to secure bond 
repayment, although in this case a piece of legislation known as the Fiscal Coordina-
tion Law contains provisions that must be observed).10
It is important to highlight that trust arrangements play an important role in 
Mexico’s sub-national bond market. These trusts are a type of special-purpose vehicle 
where a sponsor –in this case a sub-national government– transfers assets to carry 
out a specific activity (Gorton and Souleles, 2005).11 To some extent, using these legal 
contracts was a response to the federal government’s policies aimed at introducing 
10  The Fiscal Coordination Law (Ley de Coordinación Fiscal) regulates fiscal relations among states, municipal-
ities, and the federal government. As stated in Article 50, sub-national governments will be able to pledge 
revenues from these funds with the approval of state legislatures, and if the decision to do so is registered 
at a federal registry of debt obligations at the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. But most importantly, 
the Fiscal Coordination Law makes it clear that if resources from these funds are used as a guarantee when 
issuing a new debt instrument, the money raised shall be used to finance projects that benefit disadvan-
taged segments of the population (Article 33), or for activities that explicitly permitted by Article 47 of the 
law (infrastructure, modernization of cadastral systems, technological development, or scientific research, 
among others).
11  The existence and use of these legal contracts is regulated by the General Credit Titles Law (Ley General de 
Títulos de Crédito [lgtc]), which stipulates that for the issuance of participation certificates (certificados de 
participación), any economic unit can set up trusts (Art. 228c). These legal instruments allow the sponsoring 
entity to issue fiduciary debt certificates (Art. 228f).
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market-based mechanisms into the regulatory framework, but also to avoid any pos-
sibility of a federal bailout.12
In terms of the legal protection that securities investors receive under the existing 
Mexican legal framework, we consulted the general guidelines for investor protection 
described in the lMv and more specific provisions contained in the various norms 
that the National Banking and Securities’ Commission releases.13 We first focused on 
the regulations that would allow us to explain how difficult it would be for an inves-
tor to recover losses if they were caused by misleading statements in the prospectus.14 
Interestingly, the Mexican legal framework does not include explicit provisions on 
the issue of restitution of losses. If elements existed leading to the belief that the 
bond issuer had misled investors through the content of the prospectus, plaintiffs 
would need to resort to civil courts to try to prove their claim.15
Another salient issue refers to creditor protection when the possibility of a default 
arises. No specific procedures or norms exist detailing what holders of sub-national 
bonds may do if an issuer defaults on its debt obligations. It is partly due to this lack 
of a legal infrastructure that creditors will have an incentive to try to negotiate a solu-
tion outside the courts. Such negotiations may include voluntary debt restructuring 
agreements or an increase in the amount of resources to be deposited in already ex-
isting trusts. (The latter alternative would depend on the sub-national government’s 
capacity to commit additional revenue streams to cover any outstanding debt.) Bond 
purchasers in the United States have more certainty about these types of procedures, 
as many of them are clearly specified in Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.16 
Holders of bond instruments issued by sub-national governments in Mexico do not 
have the same degree of certainty or comparable levels of protection. Bankruptcy 
procedures are regulated but their provisions apply only to private entities (see the 
Law on Bankruptcy Protection Proceedings [Ley de Concursos Mercantiles]). From a 
legal standpoint, the issuer of a sub-sovereign bond cannot file for bankruptcy. 
12  As Hernández-Trillo and Smith-Ramírez (2009) explain, with the regulatory framework for debt manage-
ment introduced in 1997, sub-national governments have been forced to make their own trust arrangements, 
to collateralize debt with their own resources (either local taxes or block grants), and to assume all risks 
associated with the issuance of a new debt instrument. 
13 See cnbv, n. d.
14  The lMv defines what is to be considered misleading information (Arts. 368 and 369) and who will be res-
ponsible for the contents disclosed –Art. 86-VIII states that the issuer’s legal representative must state in 
writing that no relevant information has been omitted from the investment prospectus–, and establishes 
sanctions when these mandates are not met (Art. 376).
15  The general principle, as stated in Art.1910 of the Federal Civil Code, is that investors are legally entitled 
to restitution when they incur losses due to illegal acts (defined as acts carried out against the law or that 
fail to comply with legal requirements) (La Porta, 2005). 
16  Chapter 9 contains specific procedures to regulate the debt restructuring process of cities, towns, villages, 
counties, taxing districts, municipal utilities, and school districts in the United States. See  U.S. Courts, n. d.
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In the case of the United States, there has been a wave of recent regulatory ef-
forts to regulate securities markets more efficiently. Two salient components in these 
reforms are the amendments to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and the enactment 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Act. The amendment of rule 15c2-12 of the 1934 Secu-
rities Exchange Act has been of particular relevance for municipal securities offer-
ings, as it has placed more emphasis on issues related to issuer accountability and 
SEc oversight.17 Important features of the U.S. framework also deal with bondholder 
protection. The problem, however, is that the legal proceedings that need to be followed 
are quite complex. One example is when a creditor is seeking damages or retribution 
from an issuer. The main challenge is getting the violator (issuer) to comply with sub-
poenas and court orders to pay fines for their violation. Another challenge arises when 
transactions occur outside the U.S. jurisdiction or when transactions involve foreign 
investors and when there is the possibility of a disagreement among settling parties 
over the amount of damages. Finally, potential exists for issuers to delay payment to 
investors if it can be proven that the issuers will suffer financial hardship because of 
legal fees and other court-related costs.
It is also important to highlight that in the event issuers file for Chapter 9 bank-
ruptcy, payment due to creditors and investors may be significantly delayed. The U.S. 
legal system permits municipal bankruptcy cases to be handled by federal and qua-
si-federal governing entities (MSrb and the Securities Exchange Commission) and the 
courts. This indicates that the federal government is directly involved with these 
proceedings to ensure Sng compliance with bankruptcy laws. According to Chapter 
9 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, issuers are required to take the necessary steps 
(for example, reorganization, forfeiture of property management) to resolve internal 
organizational issues in order to meet their financial investment obligations owed to 
creditors and investors. Issuers must also carry out actions related to protecting cre d-
itors’ rights. The top 20 creditors that hold the 20 largest unsecured debts are paid 
first.18 But, federal bankruptcy courts forbid creditors from demanding collateral 
from issuers until a legal ruling has been handed down and reorganization plan for 
the issuers’ debts has been developed. Second, only the debtor (issuer) can file for reor-
ganization 120 days after the courts rule for their debt relief. Third, secured creditors 
gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition is approved (14 days 
after the order or relief).19 Thus, debtors (issuers) must forfeit all securities owed to 
17  The reforms include provisions establishing new compliance requirements for certain types of financial 
instruments, additional disclosure rules for events used to determine tax exemption, or events that are 
considered relevant for issuers’ and/or trustees’ decisions (for example, mergers, bankruptcy, unsched-
uled payments, default in payments) (SEc, n.d. a and b).
18 Bankruptcy Act Rule 3020(e).
19 Bankruptcy Act Rule 3020(e).
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creditors upon approval for reorganization.20 Fourth, debtors must also rank the top 
20 creditors that will first receive the distribution of proceeds from the disposition of 
unsecured assets (including any interest owned).21 Last, the courts assume control of 
the debtors’ properties22 until there is confirmation of a reorganization plan.23
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Code specifically states strict legal procedures issuers 
must abide by in a bankruptcy claim. This statute was established to protect inves-
tors by requiring issuers to follow federal processes in disclosing information and 
abiding by legal proceedings regarding their securities assets. According to this fed-
eral statute, issuers who file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 must do the following 
in this order: 1) file a plan with the SEc to readjust their debt obligations; 2) the plan 
must comply with this statute; investors must be paid for claims due; issuers are able 
to reorganize to get out of bankruptcy as determined by the court; 3) the plan must 
be confirmed by the court and accepted by creditors; 4) the court will oversee the 
implementation of the plan to repay investors and reestablish issuers until it is de-
termined that the case has been completed.24
Finally, we should note that in addition to the extensive federal regulations in 
the U.S. legal framework, there are many state-level regulations governing securities 
transactions within their jurisdiction (see table 1 above). This adds a layer of complex-
ity to the regulation of Sng bond markets, since bond issuers will also need to comply 
with the specific rules of the jurisdiction where they release financial instruments 
into the market.
dIscussIon: on the FeAsIbIlIty oF A bI-nAtIonAl 
bond FInAncIng mechAnIsm
Now that some of the main components of the U.S. and Mexican securities regulations 
have been introduced, it is important to think about the environment that potential 
bond buyers would encounter if they were to invest in debt instruments issued by 
sub-sovereign entities in these two countries.
One can argue that in the case of Mexico, the existing regulations tend to limit 
foreigners’ participation in Sng bond markets, due to the restrictions included in cons-
titutional Article 117. At the core of this article is Section VIII, which stipulates that 
20 Section U.S.C. 1141.
21 Bankruptcy Act Rule 1007(e).
22 Bankruptcy Act Rule 3020 (d).
23 Section U.S.C. 1125 (b). 
24 U.S. Bankruptcy Title 11, Chapter 9 (United States Code, n. d.). 
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Mexican states cannot acquire obligations to foreign governments, companies, or 
individuals, or enter into contractual agreements in a foreign currency or payable in a 
foreign country. This has numerous implications. For one, investors can only receive 
the applicable legal protection if the bond is bought through a company located within 
Mexico.  But even if a potential investor purchases public bond instruments through 
a Mexican financial intermediary, the current legal framework has additional limita-
tions that tend to reduce the attractiveness of Sng bonds (for example, increased trans-
action and information costs).
One salient limitation has to do with the lack of specific legal provisions defin-
ing the scope of responsibility of sub-sovereign bond issuers in the event of default 
or fraud. It is important to note that the concept of sub-national bankruptcy does not 
exist in Mexico’s legal framework. This legal vacuum creates uncertainty and impedes 
the proper development of the public bond market because matters like the patri-
mony that could be affected in case of a default are not explicitly addressed in the 
applicable law.25 
The lack of a solid regulatory infrastructure is also evident when one inquires 
about the legal provisions to deal with possible violations to the Securities Market 
Law (lMv). Let us assume, for example, that a bondholder has reasons to believe that 
he/she has been misled by the actions or omissions of an issuer.26 As stated in sec-
tion 4 of this article, cases like this would be treated as an administrative matter and 
would fall within the realm of civil law. Contrary to what exists in the U.S., where 
there are specialized municipal bankruptcy attorneys and a federal bankruptcy law 
that includes specific provisions for municipal bankruptcy procedures, legal proce-
dures in Mexico rely on stipulations in a Civil Code. Its provisions will apply to any 
case regardless of the nature of the claim. This is problematic because there is a dis-
connect between what Mexico’s securities regulations seek to accomplish and the 
available regulatory infrastructure to attain those goals.
The review of current securities regulations shows that despite the reforms in 
recent years, Sng bond markets in Mexico remain highly under-regulated. To a large 
extent, this is because a substantial portion of the financing needs of state and local 
governments is still covered by the central government. Evidence shows, however, 
that the financial resources states and local governments receive are insufficient to 
25  This situation has been partially addressed with the creation of Stock Exchange Certificates (Cebures). As 
explained in previous sections of the article, issuers warranty bond repayment by committing future reve-
nue streams to a trust. Since this trust is not a public entity, its regulation falls under the domain of pri-
vate law.
26  An unfortunate example of this kind of situation is the case of the northern state of Coahuila, which pur-
posely released false and misleading information to be able to issue debt far beyond the limit authorized 
by its Congress, and beyond its capability to pay (Bloomberg News, 2011). 
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cover their needs. Bond markets could become an alternative source of financing in the 
future provided proper public bond market regulations are enacted.
In the case of the United States, one observes that, although federal laws outline 
the general rules for securities market participants, much of the regulation applicable 
to Sng bonds remains the responsibility of state governments. This can substantially 
increase the cost that bond buyers must pay to acquire legal information and specialized 
advice due to varying state laws. This is crucial in defining the contracting frame-
work for Sng securities. 
Another aspect of the current regulatory framework that should be carefully 
considered is an assessment of the adecuacy of current securities laws in a potential 
cross-border bond financing mechanism. Existing legal provisions in the United States 
stipulate that when a borrowing entity wants to participate in an initial public offering, 
there must be an approved bond resolution or ordinance and a sales document for the 
securities (commonly known as an Official Statement). But as a legal expert consulted 
for this article explained, there is no mandate requiring the SEc (or other regulatory 
body) to approve or even review documentation related to the sale of debt to the pub-
lic. Thus, no existing statutory framework prevents the sale of low-quality, high-risk 
securities. Hence, important decisions regarding the quality of securities to be sold to 
investors are left to the market.27
In terms of provisions specifying creditor rights, U.S. regulations establish strict 
liability standards for municipal bond issuers (particularly for information disclo-
sure). Situations may arise in which an investor could consider that the issuer re-
leased misleading information about a security. If this occurs, the affected party may 
claim the restitution of his investment. However, contrary to what happens in Mex-
ico, U.S. legal municipal or corporate securities proceedings are used as case law to 
deal with subsequent matters pertaining to issuer fraud and deceit (in these cases, 
the burden of proof lies with the investor). 
But what does all this entail in terms of a proposal to create a bi-national bond 
financing mechanism? Evidently, assessing the feasibility of such a proposal requires 
various steps. We think a crucial step in this assessment has to do with the challenges 
involved in the required harmonization of Mexican and U.S. bond market rules. This 
27  An exception would be if the issuer fails to disclose complete and accurate information in the investment 
prospectus, as this is regulated under federal anti-fraud provisions (see rule 15c2-12 in the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act). Failure to comply with such disclosure-related provisions would provide investors with a 
valid claim to seek the restitution of losses in court. Interestingly, in municipal securities markets there is 
no road map for what should be considered as fair and accurate disclosure –this is different in the corpo-
rate borrowers’ market. The parties to each transaction collectively decide what is to be considered proper 
disclosure.
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need stems from the alleged differences among legal origins that scholars like La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) highlight. 
Reviewing the existing regulations for the issuance of Sng bonds and the legal 
mechanism to protect investors in the U.S. and Mexico allowed us to identify some 
of the immediate challenges for crafting a cross-border bond financing mechanism. The 
first consists of aligning securities rules between two nations where rules are enact-
ed and enforced at various levels of government. In spite of the most recent regulatory 
efforts in the United States, state governments have a great deal of responsibility in 
the regulation of Sng bond markets. This significantly augments coordination and 
information costs for policy makers and investors, as they would need to comply with 
a different mix of regulations depending on the jurisdiction issuing the bond. The 
decentralized nature of the U.S. legal framework for Sng (municipal) bonds implies 
that not only would policymakers need to consider the alignment of federal regula-
tions, but they must also seek harmonization of existing state legal provisions by 
participating members (for example, the California Corporate Securities Law Act [1968], 
the Arizona Securities Act, the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act [1978], and the 
Texas Securities Act [1935]).
This situation would not exist in Mexico, since the bulk of Sng bond market regu-
lations fall within the domain of the central government. In this case, the challenge 
results from the lack of an adequate state-level legal infrastructure and the incom-
patibility between existing regulations and market needs. As explained in section 2 
of this article, the Mexican market for Sng is just starting to emerge. States are begin-
ning to see debt markets as a mechanism for satisfying their funding needs and have 
been enacting reforms to comply with requirements imposed by the investors’ com-
munity and federal authorities (enactment of state laws to keep debt growth under 
control or current efforts to harmonize accounting rules, among others). However, 
there are still noticeable gaps in most state laws that need to be filled to establish fi-
nancial certainty and confidence for potential bond investors. As Uribe-Lara (2008) 
suggests, some of the observable gaps include the lack of multi-annual budget ap-
propriations to increase certainty of bond repayment, the need for better trained 
government officials, and, more generally, the need for a solid legal infrastructure 
that contributes to attaining policy goals of utmost relevance for Sng bond market 
participants. 
A second major challenge pertains to the alignment of the legal provisions aimed 
at protecting investors’ legal rights. This challenge goes far beyond what written rules 
dictate because U.S. and Mexican legal provisions are rooted in their distinct legal ori-
gins (common law vs. civil law). The United States has developed a sophisticated le-
gal framework with specific provisions to deal with municipal bankruptcy (i.e., Chapter 9 
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of the U.S. federal bankruptcy code). Mexico does not have a similar framework in 
place. If a sub-national government defaults on its bond payments, or if an investor 
seeks any kind of restitution, and instead relies on a civil code, no specific provisions 
exist to deal with the situation. And although this should clearly not be interpreted 
as a weakness, it should pave the way for a thorough debate on the properties that a 
legal system to protect bond investors should have. 
What this analysis makes clear is that the existing legal infrastructure does not 
permit the issuance of bond instruments of a bi-national nature. The feasibility of 
that endeavor would therefore depend on the capacity of the U.S. and Mexican gov-
ernments to devise and implement reforms to harmonize key aspects of existing 
bond regulations. What type of reforms would need to be implemented? Evidently, 
any agenda for reform would need to consider the fact that the sub-national bond mar-
kets are at two very different levels of development. 
As Leigland (1997) suggests, emerging economies like Mexico could accelerate 
the development of their sub-national bond markets by using the strengths of the U.S. 
municipal market as a guideline for policy design.28 The process would necessarily re-
quire the enactment of ex-ante and ex-post rules to regulate sub-sovereign bond markets 
effectively. Ex-ante rules should stipulate the purposes, types, and limits for Sng debt 
instruments, as well as issuance procedures; ex-post rules, on the other hand, would 
establish the measures to be taken in the event that an issuer becomes insolvent 
(Canuto and Liu, 2010).
The review of the Mexican legal framework allows us to conclude that, while a 
debate on regulatory harmonization is a necessary step for the creation of a bi-na-
tional mechanism of bond financing, it is crucial for Mexican policymakers to decide 
whether foreign bond buyers should be allowed to acquire instruments issued by sub-
sovereign entities and whether these entities would be allowed to incur debt obliga-
tions with foreign creditors. A subsequent task calls for the enactment of a legal 
framework that clearly defines the rights and responsibilities of market participants. 
The current market for Sng bonds in Mexico is in its infancy stage as it has only re-
cently emerged. Despite the enactment of recent key regulations, there is a strong 
need for specific provisions and court procedures to deal with the possibility of poten-
tial problematic events such as bond issuers’ default. Reforming the existing secu rities 
legal structures can contribute to increasing bond buyers certainty, reduce transac-
tion and information costs for bond instrument purchases, and change investors’ 
28  For this author, the essential strengths of the U.S. municipal bond market are reflected in its capacity to 
attract investors and issuers by promoting investor familiarity and confidence, or by establishing market 
conditions that result in acceptable returns on investment, sufficient information regarding risks, and 
tolerable borrowing costs, among others.
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perceptions of risk (especially when a comparison is made with bond instruments is-
sued by U.S. state and local governments). 
In the case of the United States, as Mahoney (2009) correctly points out, although 
securities regulations were originally conceived as a contracting system, Congress 
and the SEc have added a number of regulatory features over time. Doty (2010) reviews 
some of the recent reforms enacted by Congress and highlights the effect they have 
on the municipal securities market.  We must note that in spite of the apparent centra l-
ization of enforcement and monitoring responsibilities, the regulation of Sng (muni-
cipal) bonds falls ultimately within state government jurisdiction. Moreover, although 
securities regulations established regulatory schemes for corporate securities, they 
exempted offerings of municipal securities (Liu, 2010). This can pose important co-
ordination problems if the aim is to promote the alignment of bond market rules in 
Mexico and the United States. The feasibility of a cross-border finance mechanism 
would also require a clearer definition of the responsibilities that U.S. states would 
have vis-à-vis the federal government. 
conclusIon And toPIcs For Further reseArch
Developing a bi-national bond financing mechanism between Mexico and the U.S. 
could help reduce the gap between border infrastructure needs and available fund-
ing. This is a multi-stage project that, among other things, calls for the harmonization 
of bond market rules. This article contributes to the discussion by offering readers a 
review of the provisions that regulate the issuance of Sng bonds and rules aimed at 
protecting bond investors in these two countries. It shows that while both nations 
have a securities legal framework in place, there are differences that need to be ad-
dressed if the aim is to envision a bi-national bond financing mechanism. Evidently, 
the complexities and intricacies of the Mexican and U.S. securities frameworks go far 
beyond what has been discussed in this article. Our study has reviewed some of the 
key features of the existing securities rules with the intention of initiating a discus-
sion on the challenges that regulatory harmonization would entail. Future research 
endeavors should be geared toward answering the pending issues not fully addressed 
in this article. 
One such issue involves the design of an institutional infrastructure capable of 
enforcing binding agreements among entities corresponding to different sovereign-
ties. Part of these responsibilities could be allocated to an already operating bi-na-
tional institution: the North American Development Bank (nadbank). This institution 
was created to enhance the environmental conditions and quality of life along the 
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border region. It carries out financing activities as permitted by the amended 2004 
Charter Agreement signed by the Mexican and U.S. governments.29 nadbank could 
turn into the perfect vehicle for attaining objectives associated with the crafting of a 
bi-national bond financing mechanism (for example, issuing the bonds, or providing 
implicit or explicit guarantees to investors, or acting as underwriter). This possibil-
ity should be part of a crucial discussion aimed at revising and expanding the bank’s 
current mandate.
A second issue has to do with the differences between the civil law and common 
law approaches, how these differences are reflected in bond market regulations, and 
the way they would affect the issuance of cross-border bonds. This article highlights 
some of those differences by comparing existing securities rules. However, it recog-
nizes the need to further analyze the extent to which contrasting legal traditions could 
complicate the enactment of reforms to harmonize the legal frameworks of the two 
countries. 
Finally, we should take into account the salient role that state governments play 
in regulating municipal bonds markets in the United States, contrary to Mexico, where 
most bond market regulation is federal. If the intention of the proposed bi-national 
bond financing mechanism is to attract investors to border infrastructure projects, a 
careful comparison of bond market regulations in the U.S. border states (California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) will be needed. This type of comparison would help 
enhance our understanding of the differences in these frameworks, and the regulatory 
harmonization challenges they would pose. We consider regulatory harmonization 
one of the necessary conditions for the development of a bond financing cross-border 
mechanism. But, as is usually the case, the devil is in the details.
29 See www.nadbank.org.
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 th
e 
re
gu
lat
or
.
•  C
om
pa
ris
on
 o
f t
he
 fi
na
nc
ial
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
qu
ar
te
r t
o 
be
 re
po
rte
d 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 fi
sc
al 
ye
ar
.
3r
d 
da
y 
af
te
r t
he
 e
ve
nt
 o
cc
ur
s. 
•  C
op
y o
f t
he
 o
ffi
cia
l p
ub
lic
at
io
n 
th
at
 co
nt
ain
s t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 
of
 to
ta
l p
ub
lic
 d
eb
t o
f t
he
 ju
ris
di
cti
on
.
•  R
ep
or
t o
f t
he
 h
ea
d 
of
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
ive
 b
ra
nc
h 
to
 th
e 
   l
eg
isl
at
ur
e 
on
 th
e 
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 u
se
s o
f p
ub
lic
 fu
nd
s, 
sta
tu
s o
f p
ro
gr
am
s i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 th
e 
re
ve
nu
e 
ac
t, 
an
d 
  i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
on
 o
ut
sta
nd
in
g 
de
bt
.
•  I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
re
lat
ed
 to
 th
e 
re
gis
tra
tio
n 
of
 d
eb
t o
bl
iga
tio
ns
, 
as
 re
qu
ire
d 
by
 A
rti
cle
 9
 o
f t
he
 F
isc
al 
Co
or
di
na
tio
n 
La
w.
Q
ua
rte
rly
:
Q
ua
rte
rly
 re
po
rts
 a
s r
eq
ui
re
d 
by
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
an
ts 
(a
ud
ito
rs)
 to
 
be
 re
po
rte
d 
as
 p
re
sc
rib
ed
 b
y t
he
 se
c.
SE
C 
Ru
le
 1
5c
2-
12
• R
eq
ui
re
s a
nn
ua
l fi
na
nc
ial
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
• M
at
er
ial
 e
ve
nt
 d
isc
lo
su
re
.
•  O
th
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
de
em
ed
 m
at
er
ial
 a
nd
 n
ot
ed
 in
 d
isc
lo
su
re
 
   
ag
re
em
en
ts.
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di
ca
te
s 1
4 
sp
ec
ific
 e
ve
nt
s t
ha
t m
us
t b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
 th
e 
ev
en
t o
f 
Ch
ap
te
r 1
1 
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
.
Co
nt
en
t a
nd
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
se
s
LM
V:
 P
ro
sp
ec
tu
s c
ha
ra
cte
ris
tic
s (
Ar
ts.
 8
6,
 8
8)
 
CN
BV
 C
irc
ul
ar
 1
1-
29
:
•  I
ns
tru
cti
on
s t
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
in
ve
stm
en
t p
ro
sp
ec
tu
se
s d
e-
sc
rib
ed
 in
 C
NB
V 
Ci
rc
ul
ar
 11
-2
9,
 a
pp
en
di
ce
s H
 a
nd
 I 
•  I
ns
tru
cti
on
s f
or
 p
re
pa
rin
g 
pr
os
pe
ctu
se
s f
or
 se
cu
rit
ies
 
iss
ue
d 
by
 S
NG
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts 
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 C
NB
V 
Ci
rc
ul
ar
 
11
-2
9,
 a
pp
en
di
x L
Se
cu
rit
ie
s 
Ac
t (
19
33
)
Se
ct
io
n 
10
 (a
-f)
: I
nd
ica
te
s i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
re
qu
ire
d 
in
 th
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f t
he
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s.
Se
ct
io
n 
12
: F
als
e 
sta
te
m
en
ts 
in
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
se
s a
re
 su
bj
ec
t t
o 
leg
al 
ac
tio
n
Ad
ve
rti
sin
g 
in
 co
nn
ec
tio
n 
wi
th
 th
e 
of
fe
rin
g
CN
BV
 C
irc
ul
ar
 1
1-
29
:
• C
ha
pt
er
 6
: A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
pu
bl
ic 
of
fe
rin
g 
in
 fo
re
ign
 co
un
tri
es
•  A
pp
en
di
x K
: I
ns
tru
cti
on
s t
o 
pr
ep
ar
e 
in
fo
rm
at
ive
 b
ro
ch
ur
es
 
fo
r p
ub
lic
 o
ffe
rin
gs
.
Se
cu
rit
ie
s 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 A
ct
 (
19
34
)
a)
       S
ec
. 5
: C
an
no
t a
dv
er
tis
e 
se
cu
rit
y s
ale
s v
ia 
in
te
r-s
ta
te
 co
m
m
er
ce
 
ch
an
ne
ls.
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N
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U
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N
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on
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ue
d)
Pr
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ed
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 R
ul
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r 
Is
su
in
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SN
G
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M
un
ic
ip
al
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B
on
ds
Va
ria
bl
es
M
ex
ic
o
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
m
at
er
ial
 to
 th
e 
pr
ice
 o
r v
alu
e 
of
 a
 
lis
te
d 
se
cu
rit
y
LM
V:
 
•  A
rt.
 2
 (X
II)
: D
efi
ne
s w
ha
t i
s t
o 
be
 co
ns
id
er
ed
 “r
ele
va
nt
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n”
. 
CN
BV
 C
irc
ul
ar
 1
1-
29
, A
nn
ex
 H
: I
ns
tru
cti
on
s f
or
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 in
ve
stm
en
t p
ro
sp
ec
tu
se
s, 
fly
er
s, 
an
d 
an
y 
su
pp
lem
en
ta
ry
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 IP
O
. T
he
 d
oc
um
en
t 
in
clu
de
s d
isc
lo
su
re
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts.
U
.S
.: 
Se
e 
Ro
bb
in
s a
nd
 S
im
on
se
n 
(2
01
0)
.
Pe
rio
di
c r
ep
or
ts
LM
V:
 A
rt.
 10
4:
 Is
su
er
s m
us
t d
isc
lo
se
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
co
ns
id
-
er
ed
 re
le
va
nt
. T
he
 a
rti
cle
 lis
ts 
th
e 
do
cu
m
en
ts 
th
at
 n
ee
d 
to
 
be
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 a
nn
ua
lly
, q
ua
rte
rly
, r
eg
ul
ar
ly,
 a
nd
 a
s s
oo
n 
as
 
ce
rta
in
 e
ve
nt
s o
cc
ur
.
Se
cu
rit
ie
s 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 A
ct
 (
19
34
)
Se
ct
io
n 
13
: I
nd
ica
te
s r
eq
ui
re
d 
pe
rio
di
c r
ep
or
tin
g 
of
 re
lev
an
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
se
cu
rit
y. 
An
nu
al 
an
d 
m
on
th
ly 
re
po
rts
 re
qu
ire
d 
to
 ke
ep
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
cu
rre
nt
 o
n 
a 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 se
cu
rit
y.
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al 
di
ffi
cu
lty
 in
 re
co
ve
rin
g 
lo
ss
es
 
in
 a
 ci
vil
 lia
bi
lity
 ca
se
 d
ue
 to
 m
isl
ea
di
ng
 
sta
te
m
en
ts 
in
 th
e 
pr
os
pe
ctu
s
LM
V 
•  A
rt.
 8
6-
VI
I: 
wh
en
 th
e 
iss
ue
r (
or
 le
ga
l r
ep
re
se
nt
at
ive
) 
sig
ns
, h
e/
sh
e 
as
se
rts
 th
at
 n
o 
re
le
va
nt
 in
fo
 is
 o
m
itt
ed
 
fro
m
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s.
• A
rt.
 3
68
: P
ro
hi
bi
ts 
in
clu
di
ng
 fa
lse
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
• A
rt.
 3
76
: P
ro
hi
bi
te
d 
ac
tio
ns
 a
nd
 sa
nc
tio
ns
.
•  A
rt.
 3
83
: S
an
cti
on
s i
f m
isl
ea
di
ng
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s i
s s
ub
m
itt
ed
.
CN
BV
 C
irc
ul
ar
 1
1-
29
, A
rt.
 8
9:
 S
an
cti
on
s t
o 
be
 d
efi
ne
d 
ba
se
d 
on
 w
ha
t i
s s
tip
ul
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
LM
V.
W
ha
t d
oe
s t
he
 la
w 
sa
y a
bo
ut
 m
isl
ea
di
ng
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
(fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e, 
sa
nc
tio
ns
)?
19
33
 S
ec
ur
iti
es
 A
ct
:
Se
ct
io
n 
12
, (
a)
 (
2)
•  A
ny
 se
cu
rit
y t
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 a
n 
iss
ue
r t
ha
t i
nc
lu
de
s a
n 
“u
nt
ru
e”
 
sta
te
m
en
t o
r o
m
its
 a
 fa
ct 
in
 a
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s o
r o
ra
l c
om
m
un
ica
tio
n 
wh
ich
 
is 
un
kn
ow
n,
 g
ive
s t
he
 p
ur
ch
as
er
 (i
nv
es
to
r) 
th
e 
rig
ht
 to
 le
ga
lly
 su
e 
th
e 
di
str
ib
ut
or
 (i
ss
ue
r) 
fo
r t
he
 se
cu
rit
y w
ith
 in
te
re
st 
or
 fo
r m
on
et
ar
y d
am
ag
es
 
re
su
ltin
g 
fro
m
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly 
ow
ne
d 
se
cu
rit
y [
bu
rd
en
 o
f p
ro
of
 o
n 
iss
ue
r.]
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ov
is
io
ns
 o
n 
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st
itu
tio
n 
of
 lo
ss
es
: 
Th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l p
rin
cip
le 
(F
ed
er
al 
Ci
vil
 C
od
e, 
Ar
tic
le 
19
10
) i
s 
th
at 
in
ve
sto
rs 
ar
e 
leg
all
y e
nt
itle
d 
to
 re
sti
tu
tio
n 
wh
en
 in
cu
rri
ng
 
lo
ss
es
 d
ue
 to
 ill
eg
al 
ac
ts 
(d
efi
ne
d 
as
 a
cts
 ca
rri
ed
 o
ut
 
ag
ain
st 
th
e 
law
 o
r t
ha
t f
ail
 to
 co
m
pl
y w
ith
 le
ga
l r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts)
 
(L
a 
Po
rta
, 2
00
5)
.
•  E
ve
n 
if 
iss
ue
r c
an
 p
ro
ve
 th
at
 a
ll o
r a
 p
or
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
se
cu
rit
y’s
 va
lu
e 
is 
un
af
fe
cte
d 
by
 m
isl
ea
di
ng
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s a
lle
ga
tio
ns
, t
he
y a
re
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 
re
co
ve
r t
ho
se
 lo
ss
es
 [l
os
s c
au
sa
tio
n,
 S
ec
tio
n 
12
 (b
)].
Se
ct
io
n 
13
•  L
eg
al 
ac
tio
n 
ag
ain
st 
iss
ue
rs 
wh
o 
m
isl
ea
d 
in
ve
sto
rs 
m
us
t b
e 
ta
ke
n 
wi
th
in
 
on
e 
ye
ar
 o
f t
he
 d
isc
ov
er
y. 
No
 a
cti
on
 ca
n 
be
 m
ad
e 
if 
se
cu
rit
y 
ha
s b
ee
n 
so
ld
 fo
r m
or
e 
th
an
 3
 ye
ar
s.
Se
ct
io
n 
15
•  E
ve
n 
th
os
e 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
wi
th
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
llin
g 
pe
rso
ns
 (i
ss
ue
rs)
 a
re
 lia
bl
e 
fo
r m
isl
ea
di
ng
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
un
les
s t
he
y a
re
 u
na
wa
re
 o
f t
he
 
all
eg
ed
 m
isl
ea
di
ng
 in
fo
rm
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io
n.
Se
ct
io
n 
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La
ws
ui
ts 
un
de
r t
he
se
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s a
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 ca
lle
d 
“c
ov
er
ed
 cl
as
s a
cti
on
s.”
 
Th
ei
r c
rit
er
ia 
ar
e 
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 fo
llo
ws
:
•  A
ffe
cts
 5
0+
 in
ve
sto
rs
 o
r o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
es
 w
ho
 se
ek
 to
 
re
co
ve
r f
ro
m
 g
rie
va
nc
es
 co
m
m
itt
ed
 b
y m
isl
ea
di
ng
 is
su
er
s.
Se
ct
io
n 
18
•  T
he
 S
ec
ur
itie
s C
om
m
iss
io
n 
or
 a
ge
nc
y w
ith
in
 a
 st
at
e 
ha
s j
ur
isd
ict
io
na
l 
au
th
or
ity
 to
 in
ve
sti
ga
te
 a
nd
 p
ro
se
cu
te
 is
su
er
s w
ho
 p
ro
vid
e 
m
isl
ea
di
ng
 
in
fo
 to
 in
ve
sto
rs.
 
W
ha
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s t
o 
be
 fo
llo
we
d 
to
 re
co
ve
r l
os
se
s?
 
SE
CU
RI
TI
ES
 E
XC
H
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G
E 
AC
T 
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33
: 
Se
ct
io
n 
20
 
•  S
ta
te
s t
he
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s u
nd
er
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
se
c 
ca
n 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
an
d 
ca
ll 
fo
r j
ud
ici
al 
re
vie
w 
ov
er
 p
ro
vid
   in
g 
m
isl
ea
di
ng
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
•  C
rim
in
al 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s m
ay
 ta
ke
 p
lac
e 
at
 th
e 
di
sc
re
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
At
to
rn
ey
 
Ge
ne
ra
l.
•  U
po
n 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
by
 th
e 
se
c, 
U.
S. 
co
ur
ts 
ha
ve
 ju
ris
di
cti
on
 to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
co
nv
ict
ed
 is
su
er
(s
) c
om
pl
y w
ith
 th
e 
se
c l
aw
.
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Se
ct
io
n 
20
 (
2)
 
• P
en
alt
ies
:
a)
 F
irs
t-t
ie
r c
ou
rt 
sh
all
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
fin
e. 
i.  U
p 
to
 U
S$
5 
00
0 
fo
r U
.S.
 ci
tiz
en
 a
nd
 u
p 
to
 U
S$
50
 0
00
 fo
r n
on
-U
.S.
 
cit
ize
n 
or
ii. 
 G
ro
ss
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f fi
na
nc
ial
 g
ain
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
pl
ain
tif
f.
b)
 S
ec
on
d-
tie
r 
i.  U
p 
to
 U
S$
50
 0
00
 fo
r U
.S.
 ci
tiz
en
 a
nd
 u
p 
to
 U
S$
25
0 
00
0 
fo
r n
on
-U
.S.
 
cit
ize
n.
ii. 
 Gr
os
s a
m
ou
nt
 o
f fi
na
nc
ial
 g
ain
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t i
f t
he
 vi
ol
at
io
n 
in
vo
lve
d 
fra
ud
, d
ec
eit
, m
an
ip
ul
at
io
n,
 re
ck
les
s d
isr
eg
ar
d 
of
 a
 re
gu
lat
io
n.
c)
 T
hi
rd
-ti
er
 i. 
 Up
 to
 U
S$
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0 
00
0 
fo
r U
.S.
 ci
tiz
en
 a
nd
 u
p 
to
 U
S$
50
0 
00
0 
fo
r n
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-U
.S.
 
cit
ize
n.
ii. 
 Gr
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s a
m
ou
nt
 o
f fi
na
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ial
 g
ain
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t i
f t
he
 vi
ol
at
io
n 
in
vo
lve
d 
fra
ud
, d
ec
eit
, m
an
ip
ul
at
io
n,
 re
ck
les
s d
isr
eg
ar
d 
of
 a
 re
gu
lat
io
n 
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D 
if 
th
e 
vio
lat
io
n 
di
re
ctl
y o
r i
nd
ire
ctl
y r
es
ul
te
d 
in
 su
bs
ta
nt
ial
 lo
ss
es
 
or
 ri
sk
 o
f s
ub
sta
nt
ial
 lo
ss
es
 fo
r i
nv
es
to
rs.
 
Se
ct
io
n 
20
 (
3)
 
•  P
ro
ce
du
re
s f
or
 co
lle
cti
ng
: a
) P
ay
m
en
t o
f p
ay
m
en
t p
en
alt
y t
o 
Tr
ea
su
ry
 
De
pt
.; 
b)
 C
ol
lec
tio
n 
of
 p
en
alt
y (
in
 d
ist
ric
t c
ou
rts
 a
s o
rd
er
ed
 b
y A
tty
. 
Ge
n.
); 
c)
 R
em
ed
y n
ot
 e
xc
lu
siv
e 
(th
es
e 
pe
na
ltie
s m
ay
 b
e 
ad
de
d 
to
 e
xis
tin
g 
or
de
rs 
se
t b
y t
he
 A
tty
. G
en
., a
nd
 th
e 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n;
 d
) J
ur
isd
ict
io
n 
an
d 
ve
nu
e 
(b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
di
str
ict
 co
ur
t c
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e 
is 
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ne
d 
as
 in
di
ca
te
d 
in
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cti
on
 2
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Vi
ol
ati
on
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f C
ea
se
-a
nd
-D
es
ist
 O
rd
er
: A
 ce
as
e-
an
d-
de
sis
t 
or
de
r i
s i
ss
ue
d 
by
 th
e 
co
m
m
iss
io
n;
 re
su
lts
 in
 e
ac
h 
se
pa
ra
te
 vi
ol
at
io
n 
wi
ll 
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 a
 se
pa
ra
te
 o
ffe
ns
e, 
ex
ce
pt
 w
he
n 
a 
vio
lat
io
n 
oc
cu
rs 
du
rin
g 
a 
fa
ilu
re
 to
 
co
m
pl
y (
ea
ch
 d
ay
 w
ill 
be
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un
te
d 
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 se
pa
ra
te
 o
ffe
ns
e)
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 d
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•  M
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 ch
all
en
ge
 is
 g
et
tin
g 
vio
lat
or
 (i
ss
ue
r) 
to
 co
m
pl
y w
ith
 su
bp
oe
na
 a
nd
 
co
ur
t o
rd
er
s t
o 
pa
y fi
ne
s f
or
 m
isl
ea
di
ng
 in
ve
sto
rs.
 
•  A
no
th
er
 ch
all
en
ge
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 if
 th
e 
se
cu
rit
y t
ra
ns
ac
tio
n(
s)
 o
cc
ur
(s
) i
ns
id
e 
th
e 
U.
S.
 a
nd
 in
vo
lve
 fo
re
ig
n 
tra
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ac
tio
ns
 w
ith
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ig
n 
in
ve
sto
rs
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r i
f 
tra
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tio
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cc
ur
 o
ut
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e o
f t
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 U
.S.
 an
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 a 
su
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tan
tia
l p
re
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tab
le 
ef
fe
ct 
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e 
U.
S. 
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ot
en
tia
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isa
gr
ee
m
en
t o
ve
r a
m
ou
nt
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am
ag
es
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m
on
g 
se
ttl
in
g 
pa
rti
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•  P
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 is
su
er
s t
o 
de
lay
 p
ay
m
en
t t
o 
in
ve
sto
rs 
if 
it 
ca
n 
be
 p
ro
ve
n 
th
at
 th
er
e 
wi
ll b
e 
fin
an
cia
l h
ar
ds
hi
p 
fo
r t
he
 is
su
er
s d
ue
 to
 le
ga
l f
ee
s a
nd
 
ot
he
r c
ou
rt-
re
lat
ed
 co
sts
.
In
ve
st
or
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
m
ec
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sm
s
Cr
ed
ito
r r
ig
ht
s
Ru
le 
es
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ish
in
g 
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to
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